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Abstract 
This paper studies the evolution of prices in markets with price-comparison 
engines. We analyze laboratory data under two industry sizes and two conditions 
concerning the sample (complete, incomplete) of prices available to informed 
consumers. Distributions are typically bimodal. One of the two modes, corresponding 
to monopoly prices, tends to increasingly attract prices over time. The second one, 
corresponding to interior prices, presents a decreasing trend. Monopoly pricing can be 
an insurance against more competitive (but riskier) behavior. In fact, subjects earning 
low profits due to interior pricing in the past are more likely to choose monopoly 
pricing. 
 
Keywords: Internet Economics; Price-Comparison Search Engines; Mixed 
Strategy Equilibria; Experimental Economics.
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1. Introduction 
Despite the competition-enhancing effect of Price-Comparison search engines 
on the Internet, price dispersion in virtual search markets is systematic and persistent. 
This paper studies whether those prices will converge towards some stable 
distribution. We obtain two attractors of pricing strategies: the monopoly price, and 
more competitive pricing. One main finding is that the frequency of monopoly pricing 
appears to have a systematically increasing trend, whereas competitive prices decline 
over time. 
According to Diamond (1971), the existence of captive consumers may be 
sufficient for monopoly pricing to emerge in non-monopolistic homogeneous good 
markets. Subsequently, Varian (1980), Rosenthal (1980), Burdett and Judd (1983) and 
Stahl (1989) extended the theory. Mixed strategy equilibria render these models 
compatible with price dispersion in search markets. Along this line, Baye and Morgan 
(2001), Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000), Iyer and Pazgal (2000) and Kocas and Kiyak 
(2006) pay special attention to the role of the Internet. Morgan, Orzen and Sefton 
(2006) report experimental results confirming the basic comparative statics prediction 
of the Varian (1980) model. Also, Orzen (2008) offers some evidence for the 
conjecture by Janssen and Moraga-González (2004) concerning the collusive-pricing 
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attractor which tends to reverse Varian’s (1980) comparative statics prediction 
regarding the size of an industry.  
Some theoretical papers study the dynamic properties of price distributions in 
consumer search markets. Hopkins and Seymour (2002) show that a broad family of 
learning dynamics may be stable under sufficient ignorance. Benaïm, Hofbauer and 
Hopkins (2009), referring to Shapley (1964) best-response cycles, show that price 
time averages may converge to Nash even under unstable price dispersions.  
Cason and Datta (2006), Cason and Friedman (2003) and Cason, Friedman 
and Wagener (2005) have paid attention to the dynamics of price dispersion. 
Especially, the Edgeworth cycles in Cason et al. (2005) are evidence for the instability 
of price dispersion prediction in Hopkins and Seymour (2002). Also, the serial 
correlation of individual in Cason and Friedman (2003) can be evidence against the 
hypothesis of mixed strategy play.  
Finally, while Varian (1980) predicts agglomeration on monopoly pricing as a 
result of rational behavior, Baye and Morgan (2004) directly relate the frequency of 
monopoly pricing to the level of bounded rationality in the market. Observe that 
competitive pricing involves some probability of a higher profit but also the risk of a 
lower one.  
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In our experiment, contrary to the majority of previous studies1, subjects face a 
simulator of rival behavior following equilibrium distributions. Thus, deviations from 
equilibrium cannot be the result of learning among interacting agents. Two dynamic 
patterns occur parallel to each other. The two patterns concern two alternative peaks 
of typically bimodal price distributions. The first peak is the interior pricing mode, 
whereas the second is the monopoly pricing one. The dynamics affecting the two 
modes occur in opposite directions. Each one of the corresponding patterns remains 
invariant across different experimental conditions. The paper contains the following 
sections: Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework. Section 3 describes the 
experimental design. Section 4 reports the results and section 5 concludes. 
2. Theoretical framework 
 Consider a market for a homogeneous search good that opens for one period. 
There is a price comparison search engine, n ≥ 3 vendors, indexed through j = 1, ..., n, 
and many consumers. The Price-Comparison Search Engine, lists the firms in its 
Index, and the prices they charge. Denote by k the number of vendors on the 
price-comparison search engine. We refer with k to the Size of the Index. The search 
engine has Complete Coverage if it indexes all vendors present in the market: k = n. If 
1Cason and Datta (2006) adopt a similar strategy, but they simulate optimal consumer search behavior. 
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k < n, the search engine has Incomplete Coverage and indexes each of the n vendors 
with the same probability k/n.2  
There is a unit measure continuum of risk neutral consumers. Each consumer 
has a unit demand, and a reservation price of 1. There are 2 types of consumers. 
Non-Shoppers, a proportion λ ∈ (0, 1) of the consumer population, do not use the 
price-comparison search engine. The other consumers, a proportion 1-λ, are Shoppers 
and use the price-comparison search engine. 
Prices cannot exceed 1, and shoppers buy a unit of the product from the 
cheapest seller on the engine whereas they split equally among sellers with equal 
prices. Non-shoppers distribute themselves evenly across vendors.  
Vendors are identical with marginal costs equal to zero. They know the 
probability with which they will be on the index, but do not observe the identity of the 
other vendors on the index, before choosing prices.   
Let Πj(p) be the expected profit of vendor j charging a price p on ℝ0+. A 
vendor’s strategy is a cumulative distribution function over prices, Fj(.).3 A Nash 
equilibrium is a n-tuple {F1(.), …, Fn(.)} of cumulative distribution functions over 
prices such that for Πj* on ℝ0+, and j = 1, …, n, Πj(p) = Πj*, for all p on the support of 
Fj(.), and Πj(p) ≤ Πj*, for all p. Denote by τ the type of the search engine, and let C (I), 
2 The case of unbiased incomplete coverage is analyzed. A more complete version of the model accounting for 
biased incomplete coverage can be found in García-Gallego, Georgantzís, Pereira and Pernías (2004). 
3It is well known that this game has no equilibrium in pure strategies. 
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mean Complete (Incomplete) Coverage. Then, τ belongs to {C, I}. Denote by ϕjτ the 
probability of firm j to be on the index, such that ϕjτ = k/n. Ignoring ties, the expected 
profit of a vendor that charges p ≤ 1 is:  
𝛱𝛱𝑗𝑗(𝑝𝑝) = 𝑝𝑝 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 + 𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝜆𝜆)𝜙𝜙𝑗𝑗𝜏𝜏�1 − 𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗𝜏𝜏(𝑝𝑝)�𝑘𝑘−1 (1) 
Let ljτ be the lowest price vendor j is willing to charge to sell to both types of 
consumers when the search engine has type τ, that is: ljτ[λ/n + (1-λ) ϕjτ] – λ/n ≡ 0. 
Then, in the symmetric equilibrium4: 
𝑝𝑝 𝜆𝜆
𝑛𝑛
+ 𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝜆𝜆)𝜙𝜙𝑗𝑗𝜏𝜏�1 − 𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗𝜏𝜏(𝑝𝑝)�𝑘𝑘−1 =  𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 (2) 
All vendors are on the index with positive probability, in the sense that there is 
no vendor whose probability to be on the index is zero. Hence, they face the trade-off 
of charging the monopoly price to non-shoppers, or charging a low price to attract 
also shoppers. This leads them to randomize over prices. The price distribution when 
the market consists of n vendors, and the search engine has an index of size k ≤ n, is 
identical to the price distribution when the search engine has Complete Coverage, k = 
n, and the market consists of k vendors: FI(. ; n, k) = FC(. ; k). 
Following discussion by García-Gallego et al. (2004), a decrease in the index 
has two impacts. First, the decrease of index reduces the number of rivals with which 
a vendor has to compete to sell to shoppers from k-1 to k-2. Second, the decrease in 
the size of the index reduces the probability that a certain vendor will be on the index 
4According to Baye et al. (1992) there is also a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. 
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from k/n to (k-1)/n. Consequently, the price distribution rotates counter clock-wise, as 
in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 here 
3. Experimental design 
In a market environment like the aforementioned one, we present data from 4 
experimental conditions. The 4 treatments (C3, I3, C6, I6) correspond to the 
combination of two different industry sizes, n ∈ {3, 6}, with two sizes of the index 
(Complete, Incomplete). The design is appropriate to test the model’s comparative 
statics predictions concerning the size of the market under complete coverage by 
comparing a complete coverage triopoly (C3) to a complete coverage hexapoly (C6). 
By comparison of C3 to I3 and C6 to I6, we test the model’s hypotheses concerning 
the completeness of the index. In fact, both incomplete coverage treatments use a 2/3 
probability of being on the index of the search engine.5 In all treatments, we set λ 
equal to 1/2. 
Table 1 here 
Table 1 presents the details of our design and the statistics corresponding to 
the theoretical price distributions. This helps addressing the following testable 
hypotheses: 
H1: An increase in the number of firms in the market leads to a higher average price. 
5Thus, in treatment I3 we use k = 2 and in treatment I6 we set k = 4. 
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H2: An increase in the size of the index leads to a higher average price. 
These two hypotheses provide a test for the main prediction of the Burdett and 
Judd (1983) and Varian (1980) models respectively. The main questions we address in 
this paper are:  
H3: An increase in the number of firms in the market increases the frequency of 
monopoly pricing. 
H4: An increase in the number of indexed firms increases the frequency of monopoly 
pricing. 
As an alternative to these four hypotheses, the conjecture by Janssen and 
Moraga-González (2004) concerning the collusion-facilitating role of a decrease in 
the size of the industry tends to reverse the effects predicted here. Regarding the 
behavior of individual prices over time, the hypothesis of mixed strategy play implies 
that a firm’s pricing strategy in period t is independent from its strategy in period t+1: 
H5: A firm’s probability of setting a given price remains invariant over time. 
In order to avoid a noisy learning environment6 each subject faces a simulator 
of rival behavior whose prices follow the equilibrium distributions. Specifically, each 
subject participating in treatments C3 and I3 faces in each period 2 simulated players, 
whereas each subject in treatments C6 and I6 faces another 5 simulated players. We 
6Cason and Friedman (2003) and Warnick and Hopkins (2006) warn us on the difficulties arising in experimental 
tests of mixed strategy equilibria due to the fact that an individual agent is learning in the presence of the noise by 
rivals’ learning strategies. 
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obtain a total of 180 independent observations (a series of 50 period strategies per 
subject). We ran a total of 10 sessions at the Laboratorio de Economía Experimental 
(LEE) of the U. Jaume I in Castellón (Spain). In each session, we randomly assign 18 
subjects to two different treatments under the same price-sampling condition but with 
different industry sizes. A total of 180 subjects participate, earning approximately 20€ 
each. 
We extracted the simulated prices from the equilibrium distributions, using the 
inverse transformation method (e.g. Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).7 In order to 
guarantee that heterogeneity can be genuinely attributed to differences across 
individuals, we maintain invariant the actual realizations of the simulated players 
within each treatment.8 
4. Data analysis and main results      
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for period average prices and profits. We 
plot the evolution of these variables on Figures 2 to 4. We express profits as a 
proportion of the amount corresponding to monopoly: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆/𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖  (3) 
where i indexes subjects, t indexes time periods, pit and qit are the prices and sales of 
firm i in period t, and λ/ni is the profit level that a firm obtains by setting p = 1 and 
7 We ran the experiment using specific software in Java. 
8 There has been no mention to equilibrium mixed strategy play in the instructions because subjects could 
interpret this as a sign of correct play, encouraging myopic imitation. 
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selling only to its captive consumers. Then, πit = 1 means that subject i earned the 
monopoly profit in period t. 
Table 2 and figures 2 to 4 here 
Table 3 reports estimates of the dynamic regression equation: 
ln𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ln𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2 ln𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽3 ln 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑖𝑖3𝑖𝑖  + 𝛽𝛽6𝑐𝑐6𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽7𝑖𝑖6𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (4) 
where rpi,t-1 is the previous period logarithm of average rival prices, πi,t-1 is the past 
period profits of subject i, i3i, c6i and i6i are treatment dummy variables, ui is an 
unobserved variable capturing time-invariant heterogeneity and ϵit is a regression 
disturbance. 
Table 3 here 
We also present in Table 4 estimates of the dynamic linear probability model: 
ln𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 ln𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛼𝛼2 ln𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛼𝛼3 ln 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼5𝑖𝑖3𝑖𝑖  + 𝛼𝛼6𝑐𝑐6𝑖𝑖 +
𝛼𝛼7𝑖𝑖6𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (5) 
where mpi,t-1 is an indicator taking the value 1 if subject i sets the monopoly price in 
period t, and 0 otherwise, vi stands for unobserved time-invariant subject 
heterogeneity, and ωit is a regression disturbance. Thus, this approach accounts for the 
substantial individual heterogeneity present in the data and the underlying dynamics. 
Table 4 here 
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The estimates in Tables 3 and 4 correspond to the GMM dynamic panel 
estimators according to Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and 
Blundell and Bond (1998). These estimators are appropriate for a sampling scheme of 
small T-large N but our sample consists of 180 individuals acting during 50 
consecutive periods. So, we use stacked instruments as in Arellano (2003). 
We use three lags, ln 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , ln𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 , ln𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1  and three lags of 
ln 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , ln𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 , ln𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1   in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. For the levels equation, 
the instruments are a constant, t, 𝑖𝑖3𝑖𝑖, 𝑐𝑐6𝑖𝑖 and 𝑖𝑖6𝑖𝑖. Models with two lags of the 
regressors reveal that additional lags are not significant. The specification tests do not 
detect problems of serial correlation, suggesting that our simple specifications (4) and 
(5) adequately capture the dynamics in our data. The specification tests m1, and m2 are 
the Arellano and Bond (1991) tests for autocorrelation of order 1 and 2. If εit or ωit are 
not serially correlated, m1 should reject the null, but m2 should not reject. J is the 
Hansen’s test of overidentifying restrictions. The F in the last row tests the joint 
significance of the second lag of the regressors. 
Table 2 shows that 6-firm markets yield profits which are very close to 
monopoly pricing. On the contrary, 3-firm markets yield profits which are lower than 
the safe profit of monopoly pricing. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the average 
profit equals 1 in any of the treatments. The dispersion of profits is increasing in the 
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number of firms present in the market and is greater under incomplete than under 
complete sampling. Figure 4 shows the evolution of average profits per treatment. 
There is no systematic temporal pattern or trend and we cannot reject the hypothesis 
of serial independence according to the results of run tests. From simple inspection of 
Table 2 and Figures 2 and 3, note that the means, standard deviations and the 
distributions of prices significantly deviate from the corresponding theoretical ones. 
On the contrary, from Figure 5 observe that the counter-clockwise rotation of price 
distributions resulting from a decrease in the number of firms and the size of the index 
is in accordance with the comparison of cumulative distributions across treatment 
pairs C3-I3 and C6-I6. Although this can be a confirmation of the Burdett and Judd 
(1983) and Varian (1980) models’ predictions, we reject hypotheses H1 and H2 
through a number of different tests. Among them, the estimates of treatment dummy 
coefficients in the model of individual prices in Table 3 indicate that the ranking of 
mean prices corresponding to treatments with different firm numbers and index sizes 
is the contrary to the theoretical one. That is, a decrease in the size of the index of 
prices on the search engine and a decrease in the total number of firms in the industry 
would both lead to higher average prices, providing evidence for the collusive effect 
in Jansen and Moraga-González (2004). 
Figure 5 here 
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We analyze now the monopoly pricing and its evolution. Figure 6 contains 
price distributions under each treatment. From the graphs, observe that price 
distributions are bimodal. One mode is monopoly pricing, whereas a second mode 
corresponds to interior prices.  
Figure 6 here 
The frequency of monopoly pricing in treatments C3, I3 and I6 (17%, 14% 
and 13% respectively) is much larger than the model predicts (1.83%, 0.05% and 
6.3%, respectively). Monopoly pricing in C6 is approximately the same as in the 
theoretical prediction (17.56% against the theoretical frequency of 18%). Complete 
coverage treatments, C3 and C6, yield higher frequencies of monopoly pricing (17% 
and 18%, respectively) than the corresponding incomplete coverage treatments, which 
is compatible with H4. On the contrary, changes in the total number of firms (from C3 
to C6 and from I3 to I6) produce insignificant effects on the frequency of monopoly 
pricing, which contradicts H3. However, a more rigorous test of H3 and H4 can focus 
on the significance of treatment dummies in the Probit model of monopoly pricing. 
The estimates in Table 4 reject both H3 and H4 against the alternative that the 
frequency of monopoly pricing does not vary with the total number of firms in the 
market and the number of firms on the search engine. 
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Figure 2 shows period average prices. Regarding the last hypothesis, H5, the 
general pattern is that average prices steadily decrease in the first twenty periods and 
then tend to stabilize. The initial decrease is more pronounced in treatments C6 and I6. 
Indeed in treatment C6, average prices do not stabilize before period 30. Figure 2 also 
shows the price series excluding monopoly prices (p = 1). The evolution of interior 
prices is characterized by a strong decreasing trend. On Figure 3, observe some 
interesting patterns with respect to the frequency with which p = 1. In general, the 
frequency of monopoly pricing steadily increases in treatments C3 and I3. There are 
also increases in treatments C6 and I6, but the pattern is less clear. The estimates of 
the linear probability model for monopoly pricing, equation (5), in Table 4 reveal that 
there is an increasing trend in the frequency of monopoly pricing along the 50 periods 
of a session. At the same time, the estimates of the individual pricing model (4) in 
Table 3 show that, overall, prices present a declining trend. This implies that interior 
prices present a strongly decreasing tendency. Also, given the significance of the 
lagged own strategy coefficients, both the overall and the monopoly pricing models 
reject the hypothesis of independence of individual strategies over time, which is a 
rejection of H5.   
The pricing model confirms the existence of prices compatible with Cournot 
best responses. A firm’s price in a given period positively relates to the average price 
 16 
of rival firms in the previous period. The corresponding model with two lags rejects 
the reaction to rival prices in periods before the last. Also, a period’s price is lower 
following a period of low earnings, while further lags of a firm’s own profit were also 
non-significant. Intuitively, this finding implies that firms failing to be the most 
competitive among those in the index are more likely to adopt a higher price in the 
following period. In fact, in that case, a rational player should then revert to monopoly 
pricing. The estimates of the monopoly pricing model confirm exactly this conjecture. 
The lower the average of rival prices, the more likely it is that a firm adopts monopoly 
pricing in the next period. 
Thus, a firm engages in competitive pricing trying to be the cheapest among 
those on the search engine. In that effort, it reacts to rival past prices in the form of 
Cournot best responses. The firm will frequently fail to be the cheapest. In that case, it 
abandons competitive prices in favor of monopoly pricing. Such cycles coexist with 
an increasing trend in the frequency of monopoly pricing and a decreasing trend of 
interior prices. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper reports experiments which relate to the models by Burdett and Judd 
(1983) and Varian (1980). The data provide limited support for the static predictions 
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of the two models. However, the data analysis reveals some novel underlying 
dynamic phenomena. 
First, price distributions are bimodal. One mode corresponds to monopoly 
pricing and the other to interior price dispersion. The frequency of monopoly pricing 
remains invariant across treatments. Interior prices present a decreasing trend, 
whereas the frequency of monopoly pricing increases over time. Also, firms raise 
prices in response to higher rival prices in the past and are more likely to adopt 
monopoly pricing following a period of low profits. On the contrary, they are more 
likely to set interior prices in response to rivals adopting monopoly pricing in the 
previous period. These patterns are compatible with Cournot best responses and price 
cycles caused by firms’ switching from interior to monopoly pricing and vice versa. 
The conjecture by Jansen and Moraga-González (2004) is confirmed by 
interior prices, because monopoly pricing is not affected by the number of firms in the 
market and the sample on the search engine. Therefore, in markets with search, some 
prices will decrease over time, while, at the same time, the frequency of monopoly 
pricing will increase. Our findings have important implications for firms’ pricing 
strategies in search markets, and especially for new entrants who should expect 
dispersion to persist due to the increase in the frequency of monopoly prices and the 
decrease of more competitive ones. 
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We have focused here on the role of a single search engine. However, it is 
often the case that there are several competing search engines. Future research could 
study the role of competition among different platforms to check the robustness of our 
findings under this setup. Also, our model has assumed a homogeneous product 
market. While it is interesting to consider differentiated products, our focus has shown 
that price dispersion does not necessarily depend on differences among the products 
sold in the market.   
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Tables 
Table 1.  Design parameters 
Treatment n K ø 𝞴𝞴 Price Mean (St. dev.)  Min. Price Pr(p = 1) 
C3 3 3 1 1/2 0.60 (0.25) 0.25 1.83% 
I3 3 2 2/3 1/2 0.55 (0.18) 0.33 0.05% 
C6 6 6 1 1/2 0.70 (0.31) 0.42 17.56% 
 22 
I6 6 4 2/3 1/2 0.65 (0.28) 0.20 6.30% 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics: prices and profits 
Treatment All Prices Interior Pricing  Mon. Pricing Profits 
C3 0.56 (0.04) 0.47 (0.07) 0.17 (0.06) 0.89 (0.24) 
I3 0.55 (0.05) 0.48 (0.05) 0.14 (0.05) 0.86 (0.36) 
C6 0.47 (0.05) 0.35 (0.08) 0.18 (0.05) 0.95 (0.35) 
I6 0.49 (0.07) 0.41 (0.08) 0.13 (0.05) 1.02 (0.56) 
Standard deviations in parentheses; Mon. Pricing: frequency with which a subject sets 
p = 1. Interior pricing: p ≠ 1 
 
Table 3: Price Regressions 
 GMM (1lag) GMM (2 lags) 
ln 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1    0.1111 (0.0316)***  0.0823 (0.0477)* 
ln 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−2    - 0.0212 (0.0292) 
ln 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1    0.1646 (0.0353)***  0.1696 (0.0363)*** 
ln 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−2     0.0148 (0.0243) 
ln𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1   - 0.0293 (0.0152)* - 0.0471 (0.0201)** 
ln𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−2    - 0.0161 (0.0142) 
 23 
𝑡𝑡 - 0.0044 (0.0008)*** - 0.0044 (0.0009)*** 
𝑖𝑖3𝑖𝑖  0.0457 (0.0560)  0.0572 (0.0598) 
𝑐𝑐6𝑖𝑖 - 0.3010 (0.0859)*** - 0.3226 (0.0942)*** 
𝑖𝑖6𝑖𝑖 - 0.1805 (0.0606)*** - 0.1904 (0.0666)*** 
Const. - 0.4294 (0.0536)*** - 0.4667 (0.0684)*** 
Specification tests (p-values) 
𝑚𝑚1  0.000  0.000 
𝑚𝑚2  0.423  0.856 
𝐽𝐽  0.198  0.099 
𝐹𝐹 2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙  0.447 
Two-step system GMM estimates of equation (4). The dependent variable is ln𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.  
 
Table 4: Monopoly pricing regressions 
 GMM (1lag) GMM (2 lags) 
ln𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1    0.0726 (0.0351)**  0.0495 (0.0529) 
ln𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−2    - 0.0117 (0.0381) 
ln 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1   - 0.0326 (0.0173)* - 0.0385 (0.0182)** 
ln 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−2    - 0.0204 (0.0126) 
ln𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1   - 0.0251 (0.006)*** - 0.0313 (0.0120)*** 
 24 
ln𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−2    - 0.0062 (0.0080) 
𝑡𝑡  0.0014 (0.0004)***  0.0013 (0.0005)*** 
𝑖𝑖3𝑖𝑖 - 0.0176 (0.0499) - 0.0266 (0.0513) 
𝑐𝑐6𝑖𝑖  0.0347 (0.0556)  0.0389 (0.0569) 
𝑖𝑖6𝑖𝑖 - 0.0217 (0.0469) - 0.0243 (0.0477) 
Const.  0.0788 (0.0411)*  0.0748 (0.0427)* 
Specification tests (p-values) 
𝑚𝑚1  0.000  0.000 
𝑚𝑚2  0.707  0.674 
𝐽𝐽  0.112  0.160 
𝐹𝐹 2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙  0.135 
Two-step system GMM estimates of equation (5). The dependent variable is ln𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.  
 
Figures 
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Figure 1. Price rotation when k decreases to k’  
 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of prices and interior prices  
 
 
Figure 3. Evolution of the frequency of monopoly pricing 
 
 
Figure 4. Evolution of average profits 
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Figure 5. Observed prices. The dark line: treatment with a larger index size 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Histograms of price distributions, per treatment 
